SECTION 7

TERRORISM RESPONSE—CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT, PREVENTION, AND AWARENESS

Transportation systems should prepare to prevent, identify, mitigate (if possible), and respond to emergencies resulting from terrorism. Section 3 of this Guide discussed in detail the use of incident management organizations to support emergency response. This section identifies specific recommendations for addressing terrorism.

The public transportation industry, working cooperatively with local, state, and federal agencies, is building a consensus about how to enhance emergency preparedness capabilities for terrorism. As shown in Figure 7-1, this approach requires the following:

- Identifying critical awareness and preparedness functions and defining critical facilities, equipment, systems, and structures to be protected;
- Incorporating these functions and protection requirements into daily operations to ensure their continued relevance under heightened threat conditions;
- Assessing effectiveness through new procedures and evaluations (e.g., proficiency testing, facility breach assessments and penetration testing, drills, simulations, and exercises);
- Revising functions and methods, based on the results of implementation and lessons learned; and
- Sharing best practices throughout the industry and with partners at the local, state and federal levels of government.

The approach shown in Figure 7-1 begins with an identification of transportation system priorities about response to a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Typical priorities within the public transportation industry are presented in Table 7-1.

In addressing these priorities, transportation systems have developed programs that emphasize the following:

- Assessment of existing capabilities,
- Prevention,
- Awareness, and
- Incident response protocols.

Through these programs, transportation systems are working to ensure well-prepared employees, assigned roles and responsibilities, clear chains of command, and effective communication and coordination with local responders. Each emphasis area is discussed below.

ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES

When beginning to plan for terrorism preparedness, many transportation agencies establish a list of assumptions reflecting the capabilities of the system to respond to specific types of circumstances and clarify when and how the system would need assistance from local, state, and federal responders. These assumptions are an important starting point for conversations with local responders and emergency planning agencies about transportation capabilities to support response to an incident on its vehicles or within its facilities, as well as response to a community-wide incident. Typical assumptions identified by transportation systems are as follows:

- The system and its service area are vulnerable to terrorist incidents. Incidents may be directed against the system, its employees, passengers, and infrastructure, or against other locations within the agency's service area.
- Terrorist incidents may involve biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive (B-NICE) materials and may include arson, shootings, kidnapping or hostage taking, sabotage, and similar activities.
- Generally, the system's resources and authority for combating terrorist attacks may be very limited; therefore, the system should work with the local community to establish and maintain a program to prepare for and manage the effects of terrorist events.
- An effective assessment program will provide the local community with continuing assessment of the system's vulnerability to terrorism, planning and training to prepare for and respond to such events, and cooperative development of operational concepts and plans to be used to manage an actual or suspected event in the transportation environment. Such a program will also identify the resources and capabilities of the transportation agency to support community response to terrorist events.
- First responders in an actual or suspected terrorist event occurring at or near the transportation system are likely to



Figure 7-1. Approach to integrating terrorism planning.

be drawn from employees and local emergency responders, including fire services, law enforcement, hazardous materials, emergency medical services, and/or other public safety departments.

- The transportation system, if targeted in the terrorist event, is likely to have personnel on the scene. Transportation personnel should be trained to recognize the event, report specific information to the transportation operations control center, isolate the event, evacuate the scene if appropriate because of the local conditions, and wait at the scene or evacuation site for local first responders. Transportation personnel should be trained to recognize the potential for secondary devices and security issues at the event and evacuation sites.
- If a devastating event destroys part of the transportation system and/or incapacitates transportation personnel on the scene, transportation supervisors should be dispatched to assess the scene from a safe vantage point and provide information to first responders.
- Effective response to chemical and biological weapons may require specialized equipment to detect and identify chemical or biological agents, mass decontamination

TABLE 7-1 Public transportation system priorities

- Improving capabilities to preserve life in all threatened/actual terrorism events, particularly those involving explosives and the potential release of CBRN agents.
- Improving capability to implement and support the incident command system and to work with incident commanders established by local responders.
- Improving technical and procedural communication links with local response agencies.
- Developing a coordinated program of planning, training, and exercises with local responders.
- Integrating into local responder automated threat warning systems and local responder automated emergency response and incident management systems.
- Enhancing information sharing regarding threats, training, community resources, and major events planning.
- Enhancing existing or developing mutual aid agreements.
- Developing capabilities to prevent a threatened act and/or expansion of an actual incident, including ability to locate, access, render safe, control, contain, recover, and dispose of a terrorist device that has not yet functioned.
- Developing coordinated plans for evacuating, rescuing, decontaminating, transporting, and treating victims in a major terrorism event.
- Enhancing capabilities to prevent secondary casualties as a result of contamination, collateral threats, or secondary devices.
- Managing emergency public information to ensure adequate and accurate communications with the public from all involved response agencies.
- Improving capabilities to restore essential services and mitigate suffering and loss.

capabilities, the means to treat mass casualties (including conducting triage and using specialized pharmaceuticals that have a narrow window of effect) and the capability to deal with mass fatalities. Because the system probably will not be able to provide these special and specific capabilities, the system should rely on local, state, and federal responders.
- Recovery from a terrorist attack can be complicated by the presence of persistent agents, additional threats, extensive physical damages, and mass casualties.
- All security and emergency response planning will be coordinated with local responders and will follow the basic guidelines established in the community emergency plan and/or terrorism incident annex. The transportation system will integrate its activities into the ICS established by local responders.

Transportation System Activities To Consider In Developing Plans And Procedures

Depending on the size of the system and the service levels provided, transportation personnel may assume various roles in supporting response to a terrorist event, a precursor event, or a suspected event. When developing plans and procedures for these activities, based on the above-identified assumptions, transportation systems should commit to preparedness programs that consider the following elements:

- Clear identification of roles and responsibilities of transportation operators, dispatchers, supervisors, and facilities/station managers;
- Recognition of passenger communications and public information requirements and preparation of advance materials, such as station announcements and press releases, as well as specific messages to be relayed to affected passengers at the scene;
- Training of employees to recognize potential terrorism events and their precursors and to report these events accurately and in a manner useful for internal review and investigation; and
- Ensuring transportation supervisors will coordinate closely with the transportation operations control center. If the report is a legitimate event or suspicious occurrence for which there is no readily identifiable explanation, local responders will be notified according to protocols established between the transportation system and the responders.

Transportation personnel at an incident scene will act to isolate the scene, evacuate potentially affected persons when appropriate and necessary, deny entry to the scene, and reroute service to address the scene location and specific characteristics of the incident. Addressing the scene location and specific characteristics of the incident may include the following response measures for suspected agent release

- On a vehicle (e.g., immediate stop and evacuation, movement to nearest station/safe location then evacuation, movement to sparsely populated station/safe location then evacuation, and ventilation issues);
- In a station (e.g., evacuation/station closure, vehicle movement through station, notification of transportation personnel in station, public address announcements, scene control at station, and ventilation issues); and
- In multiple affected vehicles and/or stations (e.g., evacuation, vehicle movement, scene control, public communications, and ventilation issues)
  - Notification procedures (e.g., internal transportation, local law enforcement, fire services, hazardous materials unit, local hospital(s), FBI and other mutual aid partners, and other state and regional specialized units); and
  - Security considerations for evacuation site(s) (e.g., secondary devices/attacks).

In addition, transportation personnel will

- Have a process in place for mobilizing supervisors and other transportation personnel to the scene(s) of the suspected/actual incident(s);
- Be able to provide arriving responders with a resource inventory of transportation materials and equipment available to support response at and near the scene and will support the identification of staging areas;
- Understand how to integrate their response into the local responder ICS and will support first-responder field operations with the use of transportation vehicles, equipment, and personnel;
- Support local responders in performing on-site searches of transportation stations, vehicles, and facilities;
- At the scene, attempt to contain affected and potentially affected persons, discourage self-evacuation, and identify all persons present at the incident;
- Have clear procedures for station/facility closure and system suspension of service, as well as for the re-opening of stations/facilities and the restoration of suspended service;
- Support HAZMAT management and cleanup after an incident.

For information, see FTA's *Guidelines for Managing Biological and Chemical Releases in Rail Tunnel Systems*.

PREVENTION

To address the range of credible threat scenarios, agencies have established baseline security and preparedness levels

for passenger facilities and non-revenue facilities. Passenger baselines emphasize procedures and technologies to identify, report, investigate, and resolve objects, actions, substances, or people that do not belong in the open and accessible areas of the system. Infrastructure baselines focus on preventing access to unauthorized areas and critical system components by ensuring that those personnel who access these locations have legitimate need to be there and are sufficiently credentialed by the system. The objective of these baselines is to make it easier to identify those occurrences and activities that could portend a terrorist event, including the release of CBRN agents or the detonation of a planted device.

Passenger Prevention Baseline

To support the prevention of terrorist incidents in passenger service, transportation systems should consider the following.

Coordinate with Employees To Solicit Their Support and Involvement

Protecting passengers and revenue service is a critical function for employees. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit executive leadership around the country has forged new partnerships with public transportation employees. Employees have contributed to system programs by sharing ideas; modifying equipment, technology, and procedures to enhance access control and intrusion detection; and developing recommendations for new policies and protocols. Other activities performed to improve the capabilities of employees to respond include

- Management meetings with operating and other employees to discuss security issues, solicit suggestions, and review proposals for technology and procedures being considered for implementation;
- Formal and informal management meetings with employee security committees, working groups, and union representatives to discuss threats and contingency planning and to address employee concerns about their safety and level of training to manage specific situations;
- Addressing security/preparedness performance as part of employee performance evaluation criteria;
- Providing paid time off or other benefits as rewards to employees who make security/preparedness suggestions that are implemented;
- Supporting employee participation in training courses offered by the National Transit Institute (NTI) and the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI); and
- Attending FTA's Emergency Preparedness and Security Forums.

Enhance Uniform Personnel Presence

Uniform personnel presence can be enhanced by

- Providing brightly colored safety vests to all transportation employees;
- Increasing police/security patrols on public transportation facilities and assigning 24-hour fixed posts to major stations under heightened threat conditions;
- Using extended shifts (12 hours), overlapping shifts, employee overtime, and expanded extraboard procedures to provide more personnel during special events and heightened threat levels;
- Using additional hires and contracts with local law enforcement to supplement existing programs or provide specific functions such as K9 units, employee training, security technology planning, and threat and vulnerability assessment;
- Using light-duty personnel to staff fixed posts in passenger stations; and
- Increasing coordination with vendors in transit stations, neighborhood watch and school security programs, and the media to promote awareness and vigilance.

Incorporate Security into Daily Inspection Procedures

This should include revision of vehicle pre-trip inspection procedures and forms to include security. During daily work routines, check garages, stations, depots, and terminals for suspicious activity, packages, or devices. Typical issues addressed during inspections are presented below for bus, light rail, and heavy rail service. These general recommendations were developed as a cooperative venture with industry, FTA, and NTI. Pages from the NTI Training Guide are included in Figures 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4. Additional information is available at http://www.ntionline.com.

Emphasize Good Housekeeping

Keep a clean and organized environment where materials and items are stored appropriately. This enhances the overall security and safety of a system by

- Making it easier to identify unusual objects or items that are out of place;
- Making it more difficult for a terrorist to hide something;
- Aiding first responders by making it easier to search for suspected devices;
- Enabling quicker rescue efforts; and
- Facilitating recovery from an incident.

(text continues on page 7-8)

BUS SYSTEMS

BUS OPERATIONS

Be alert to things that are suspicious or out of place at garages, depots, transfer stations and shelters. Also be observant of activity, people and vehicles along bus routes.

BUS OPERATORS

Make quick and efficient vehicle inspections part of your normal routine. The few minutes you spend doing it may save lives. During pre-trip inspections, layovers or when your bus has been unattended, look for suspicious packages, devices, wires, substances and signs of tampering.

BUS MAINTENANCE

When receiving or releasing vehicles look for suspicious packages, devices, wires, substances and signs of tampering. Quite often, if something is intentionally "planted" on a vehicle or in a facility, the mechanic or maintenance person will be the first to notice. If something seems out of the ordinary during an inspection, report it to your supervisor. In particular, check the engine compartment for foreign objects or a false compartment in the air filter area, additional wires from the battery and unusually clean components and devices. Inspect the fuel and air tanks for inconsistent and missing connections.

SIGNS OF VEHICLE TAMPERING

- Scratches or marks made by tools
- Unusually clean or dirty compartments
- Items attached to vehicles or objects with magnets or duct tape
- Open or disturbed compartments and cabinets

SECURITY SWEEP CHECK LIST

INTERIOR

- Floors
- Above, on and below seats
- Operator's area
- Steps
- Internal lift mechanism
- Compartments
- Lights

EXTERIOR

- Wheel wells
- Engine compartments
- Bus frame and underbody
- Exhaust system
- External lift mechanism
- Fuel and air tanks
- Rooftop area of CNG buses

On commuter buses, also check interior and exterior luggage compartments and lavatories.

Figure 7-2. Bus security information.[1]

[1] National Transit Institute. *System Security Awareness for Transit Employees,* Training Guide, 2002, p. 8.

LIGHT RAIL SYSTEMS

LIGHT RAIL OPERATIONS

Be alert and proactive in looking for suspicious people, vehicles, activities, packages, devices and conditions along the right-of-way, in stations and facilities, and on the trains. Check around and in open and idle spaces and along walls.

STATIONS

- Light posts and fixtures
- Trash containers
- Benches
- Stairs/escalators
- Information booths
- Electrical cabinets
- Lights

RIGHT-OF-WAY

- Between and under rails and switches
- Fences and retaining walls
- Electrical system components
- Signal cabinets, poles and lines
- Communication lines and equipment
- Bridge supports and beam
- Tunnels

MAINTENANCE YARDS/SHOPS

- Perimeter fences and walls
- Light fixtures
- Service platforms and bays
- Storage areas and sheds
- Electrical cabinets
- Between and under rails
- Around cars and vehicles

LIGHT RAIL VEHICLES

Make quick and efficient vehicle inspections part of your normal routine. Check rail cars for suspicious packages, devices, wires, substances, and signs of tampering. If something seems out of the ordinary during an inspection, report it to your supervisor.

INTERIOR

- Floors and seats
- Operator's area
- Stairs and wheelchair ramps
- Above, on and below seats
- Articulation shroud/baffle
- Compartments and lights

EXTERIOR

- Undercar equipment area
- Truck and truck frame
- All equipment around the coupler area
- Articulation joint
- Electrical and other compartments
- Pantograph and rooftop cabling[b]

[b]Note: The roof of a LRV is a High Voltage area. Do not contact roof components.

Figure 7-3. Light rail security information.[2]

[2] National Transit Institute. *System Security Awareness for Transit Employees,* Training Guide, 2002, p. 9.

HEAVY RAIL OPERATIONS

Be alert and proactive in looking for suspicious people, vehicles, activities, packages, devices and conditions along the right-of-way, in stations and facilities and on the trains. Check around and in open and idle spaces and along walls.

STATIONS

- Vending machines
- Trash containers
- Turnstiles
- Kiosks/information booths
- Stairs/escalators
- Phone booths
- Benches
- Lights and signs

RIGHT-OF-WAY

- Between and under rails and switches
- Fences and retaining walls
- Electrical system components
- Signal cabinets, poles and lines
- Communication lines and equipment
- Perimeter fences and retaining walls
- Culverts/overpasses

RAIL CAR

- Floors and floor compartments
- Space between cars
- Operator's area
- Undercar equipment area
- Above, on and below seats
- Truck and truck frame
- Interior compartments and lights

TUNNELS

- Cable and pipe chases and ductwork
- Exits stairs and shafts
- Behind and beneath cables and pipes
- Signal cabinets and lines
- Electrical system components
- Communication lines and equipment
- Passage ways and services rooms
- Between and under rails

MAINTENANCE YARDS/SHOPS

- Perimeter fences and walls
- Light fixtures
- Service platforms and bays
- Storage areas and sheds
- Electrical cabinets
- Between and under rails
- Around cars and locomotives

ELEVATED STRUCTURES/BRIDGES

- Footings, piers and abutments
- Hidden areas of supports and beams
- Stairwells and walkways
- Service rooms and cabinets
- Between and under rails
- Decking and railings

Figure 7-4. Heavy rail security information.[3]

[3] National Transit Institute. *System Security Awareness for Transit Employees,* Training Guide, 2002, p. 10.

Enhance Connections to Passengers

This can be done through

- Regular public address announcements to remind passengers and employees to keep control of their belongings and to report anything out of the ordinary;
- Rider communications and posters in stations and vehicles;
- Installation of communication devices/emergency phones that provide a direct link between riders and transportation personnel;
- Improvements in off-hours waiting areas by locating them closer to token booths or by stationing light-duty personnel nearby;
- Establishment of direct 1-800 numbers or cell phone star numbers to report suspicious activity and other concerns;
- Distribution of flyers and newsletters on security upgrades and programs and of posters emphasizing recommendations for passengers to report suspicious activity;
- Revised/upgraded websites to more quickly convey information such as service disruptions to riders, employees, the news media, and others; and
- Creation of public education and awareness campaigns to communicate agency rules on left behind/unattended packages and to encourage everyone to be the eyes and ears of the agency and report suspicious activity.

Enhance Coordination on Maintenance and Construction Performed Within Sight of Passengers

This can be accomplished by

- Promoting improved coordination on (1) work to be performed by employees, contractors, and vendors in stations or facilities and (2) the likely equipment and materials that may be used for this work as well as its location; and
- Including, where necessary, vendor credentialing and express authorization from transportation operations control to access the work site, use of escorts for contractors and vendors, and fixed post security to protect the work site.

Improve Surveillance in Passenger Facilities and Vehicles

This can be accomplished through

- Installation of CCTV cameras with digital recording capabilities in stations and transfer centers with feeds to station manager booths and/or the operations control center;
- Installation of surveillance cameras on vehicles with digital recording capabilities;
- Installation of monitors on station platforms with system travel and safety information and security messages on suspicious activity and left behind/unattended items;
- Re-design/installation of passenger kiosks with safety and security features, such as blue lights or emergency phones, as well as distribution racks for agency materials;
- Closing off or limiting access to remote staircases, passageways, and corridors, and closing off restrooms;
- Removing obstacles to clear lines-of-sight on station platforms, and painting station platforms and walls white to enhance visibility and safety;
- Sealing off spaces that permit concealment (such as under the stairs in stairwells), including structural nooks and crannies and overhead ducting;
- Reinforcing natural surveillance through station announcements supporting public safety and security and revised policies on left behind/unattended objects;
- Installing fencing and CCTV in station parking lots;
- Using reinforced concrete barriers or portable steel barriers to block access to sensitive areas within stations and/or direct pedestrian traffic;
- Removing trash containers and recycling bins from revenue areas or replacing them with explosive containment models; and
- Moving or removing bicycle lockers and newspaper/food vending machines from station areas and underpasses.

Coordinate Enhanced Physical Inspection of the System in Response to Heightened Threat Levels

This can be achieved by

- Additional vehicle sweeps at the end of each vehicle run or tour;
- Daily and/or hourly track walks in critical areas, or the posting of fixed personnel at key locations;
- Daily (or even more frequent) track walks or patrols in track areas with easy public access and additional patrols of stations and facilities;
- Hourly walk-throughs of stations by station managers;
- Immediately removing, inspecting, and destroying any unattended or left behind items from stations and vehicles; and
- Station closures/service modifications for highly vulnerable locations served by the agency.

Infrastructure Prevention Baseline

To support infrastructure protection, preventing unauthorized access to exclusive areas in the public transportation environment has been emphasized. Key areas of concern include critical operating facilities (e.g., tunnels, bridges, and

elevated track and structures); non-revenue facilities (e.g., rail yards and bus garages); points of entry (e.g., access grates and cross-passages); and key utility and telecommunications substations and nodes. To support terrorism prevention, systems have created programs to control access to critical assets and to verify the intentions of those personnel who routinely work in, near, or around these assets. The following activities have been taken and are suggested for consideration

1. Systems have developed policies on background checks for employees to ensure that personnel with access to critical facilities do not have affiliations with groups that may wish to harm the system. The following activities have been performed:
   - Hiring practices have been modified to include criminal background checks of new employees. This requirement is often carried out through submission, with the employment application, of a signed authorization for criminal records investigation and a fingerprint card.
   - For existing employees, systems have remained sensitive to concerns about privacy and perceptions about lack of trust, particularly given that the employees are being asked to serve as the system's eyes and ears and to perform additional tasks.
   - Other approaches include
     – Awaiting further guidance from FTA/TSA/DHS;
     – Fingerprinting employees and filing fingerprint cards for later use and/or reference;
     – Asking employees to complete a general social security number/credit history/criminal background check authorization form and initiating the investigations or filing the forms for later use; and
     – Submitting lists, including the names of all employees and contractors/vendors, to the FBI and/or local law enforcement.
2. Public transportation systems have developed policies for employee identification and access control by the following:
   - Requiring employees to display official photograph identification cards, issued by the agency;
   - Providing lanyards and clips to support standardized display of identification;
   - Sending emails and reminders, attached to paychecks, about the employee identification display policy;
   - Restricting access to sensitive areas (e.g., public transportation operations control centers and bus storage facilities); and
   - Integrating employee identification systems into electronic access control systems for proximity card readers or magnetic strip card readers at critical locations (e.g., operations control centers and vehicular gates at facility entrance posts).
3. Systems have developed policies on background checks for contractors and vendors. Many transportation agencies remain most concerned about contractors, vendors, and other friendly uniform service personnel, such as package delivery and utilities workmen, who currently access their facilities with little or no credentialing. To address this situation, transportation agencies have done as follows:
   - Required contractors and vendors to develop policies and procedures on the screening of employees who may access the transportation system, including policies for social security checks and criminal records checks;
   - Required contractors and vendors with employees on site to provide official documentation to the system on the completion of these checks and the results;
   - Required escorts and/or authorization from transportation dispatch before granting any non-employee access to critical areas within the transportation system;
   - Developed special badging systems/photograph identification for contractors, vendors, and others who may access the system; and
   - Revised procedures for managing deliveries and coordinating with local vendors and suppliers on access procedures.
4. Many public transportation systems have taken steps and adopted new policies for controlling agency information, employee uniforms, and keys, including the following:
   - Requiring requests for drawings and plans to be delivered in writing or in person if they relate to sensitive agency materials;
   - Removing material from transportation agency websites, including schematics and plans;
   - Requesting vendors to remove references to specific system information from their websites; and
   - Conducting monthly inventories of uniforms and keys, with active investigation if discrepancies are found.
5. Systems have improved mailroom procedures for handling packages through the following:
   - Developing specific guidelines for receiving packages;
   - Developing written guidelines for managing suspicious packages and letters;
   - Providing training sessions for mailroom employees;
   - Providing direct contact numbers for transportation police and security personnel; and
   - Issuing personal protective gloves to all mail handlers.
6. Public transportation systems have enhanced the security of administrative headquarters and other major facilities through the following:

- Locking doors and limiting access points to a single entry;
- Developing visitor sign-in protocols and temporary badges;
- Relocating visitor parking (except for persons with disabilities) further from the facility;
- Providing CCTV coverage of the visitor sign-in area;
- Stationing administrative or light-duty personnel at entry points with radios provided for direct communication with transportation police or security personnel;
- Upgrading security at employee parking facilities by using gates and CCTV systems, and improving enforcement of sticker policies and the towing of unauthorized vehicles;
- Installing concrete planters, bicycle lockers, and other items to restrain forced vehicular intrusion into sensitive areas; and
- At sensitive field locations, installing electronic locks that can only be opened using a proximity or a magnetic swipe card.

7. Some systems are addressing the need for backup emergency operations facilities through the following:
   - Constructing or identifying secondary and tertiary EOCs to be used if a major disaster renders the system's main EOC inoperable;
   - Establishing a Mobile Command Center (bus equipped with radio gear and the ability to serve as an EOC headquarters if the system's building is damaged or destroyed); and
   - Providing satellite phones to senior managers to use if conventional telecommunications systems such as cellular telephones fail.
8. Systems have made it harder to attack areas surrounding stations and elevated trackways, by
   - Reinforcing concrete barriers and signs to restrict access and parking under or near infrastructure;
   - Coordinating with state department of health officials on airborne contamination issues and initiation of a program of baseline measures under normal conditions for later comparisons; and
   - Coordinating with land owners next to critical infrastructure, urging them to report suspicious activity.
9. Many systems are securing perimeters for non-revenue areas through the following:
   - Enhanced investment in fencing and electric gates;
   - CCTV and motion detection alarms for yard perimeter fencing and shop facilities;
   - Cameras on rooftops and adjacent buildings to monitor remote locations and hard-to-see areas;
   - Electronic access control systems and/or posting of security or light-duty personnel near access locations to tunnel passages and critical utilities and equipment rooms;
   - Added surveillance cameras to monitor key access points to non-revenue facilities; and
   - Additional cameras at unsupervised building egresses and loading areas.
10. Some systems are securing tunnels and elevated structures through the following:
    - Increasing police/personnel patrols and assigned 24-hour fixed posts for major tunnel shaft/portal locations and other critical areas;
    - Installing programmable intrusion detection equipment to alert police to the exact location of any unauthorized intrusion into critical structures and facilities;
    - Installing CCTV and motion and entry alarms at certain entrances to underground tunnels and some maintenance access points;
    - Developing monitoring protocols, including contracts with 24-hour monitoring companies off site of system property (for intrusion detection, alarms, and sensors); and
    - Testing intrusion detection systems engineered to distinguish between trains and people entering underground/underwater tunnels.

AWARENESS

Unlike airlines, where security checkpoints screen passengers and luggage, public transportation is designed to be universally accessible. In this open environment, protection relies largely on awareness or the recognition of suspicious, out-of-place, or unusual activities or behavior, packages, devices, and substances.

To plant an explosive device or release a hazardous agent into a system successfully, the perpetrator is very likely to perform certain actions that will make him or her stand out from the larger crowd of passengers, employees, contractors, vendors, and others. He or she may be

- In an unauthorized or restricted area;
- On agency property without proper identification, uniform, or safety gear;
- In the wrong place or appear lost;
- Pacing, nervous, or jumpy;
- Inappropriately dressed for the weather (e.g., wearing a long bulky coat on a warm day);
- Acting in a disorderly manner and alarming or disturbing others;
- Quickly exiting an area after abandoning a package;
- Taking photos of equipment and secure areas;
- Carrying a weapon or suspected weapon; or
- Expressing an unusual level of interest in operations, equipment, and personnel.

Unfamiliar couriers, repair personnel, utility crews, or other trusted employees or trusted uniforms may be in the wrong

place or behaving in a manner inconsistent with their function at the system. Cars, trucks, motorcycles, and bicycles may be parked or standing in out-of-place or strange locations; overloaded or sagging vehicles may be parked in passenger loading zones or directly across from station entrances or exits.

These circumstances are not always easy to identify. However, through training and exercising, front-line employees and supervisors, who have direct contact with the public or the vehicles and facilities used by the public, are developing the skills necessary for observing, determining, and reporting people acting suspiciously and activities that are suspicious or out of place.

In all such activities, transportation systems should be careful to emphasize that suspicion is never based on race, color, ethnicity, creed, or gender, and is always based on

- Where someone is;
- When they are there; and
- What they are doing.

A similar set of awareness criteria have been developed for suspicious packages, devices, and substances, based on the reality that a device or substance left behind by a perpetrator with the intention to harm the system can be identified and rendered safe.

For packages and devices, suspicion is based on the type and location of the package. Transportation employees are urged to remember, particularly during heightened threat conditions, that not all lost-and-found items are suspicious packages. Often, those items left in conspicuous areas, such as on seats, in a restroom, next to a phone booth or vending machine, or on a station platform are simply forgotten items. However, it is suggested that extra care be used even when evaluating what appear to be items clearly forgotten by passengers.

However, when an empty briefcase is found, such an item may have been placed by a potential terrorist who is testing the procedures of the transportation system pertaining to this type of item. Information may be collected on how long it took the system to identify it as an unattended item, if it was picked up before any type of scan was completed, whether people were moved away from the location before the item was approached, whether the bomb squad was called, and, if so, how long it took them to arrive, among myriad other items. This becomes important planning information to terrorists. For example, if an empty briefcase in a rail station causes all of the trains approaching the station to be queued at the station on either side of the test station, the terrorist has learned that the most effective target (maximum passengers and trains) is the station on either side of the station containing the hoax item. Therefore, what may seem to be an innocuous event may instead be designed to collect information that can be used to inflict serious damage, injury, and death.

For substances, suspicion is based on the presence of a fine powder, residue, fog, mist, oily liquid, or odor with no identifiable or explainable source. It is also based on two or more people showing similar signs of distress or physical reaction. Again, particularly during heightened threat conditions, transportation personnel are encouraged to remember that not all powders or liquids are suspicious substances and not every sick person is a victim of an attack or release.

Signs of suspicious packages and devices include an object, parcel, bag, or other item that

- Is left or intentionally placed in an out-of-the-way location that is not easily visible;
- Matches something described in a threat received by the system or has a threatening note attached;
- Is an abandoned item or container, such as a thermos, propane canister, fire extinguisher, or piece of pipe;
- Has visible wires, batteries, a clock or timer, or has bottles, tanks or bags attached;
- Is abandoned by someone quickly leaving the area;
- Includes a bag, box, or package emitting an odor, mist, or oily liquid; or
- Is a bottle filled with unusually colored liquid or has strange objects inside.

Transportation employees observing any of the following conditions should be aware that they may be encountering a suspicious substance and proceed cautiously:

- An unexplainable or pungent odor;
- A suspicious package emitting a vapor or odor;
- Abandoned or out-of-place aerosol or manual spray devices;
- A broken bag, envelope, bottle, light bulb, or other potential dissemination device that has residue or a threatening tag attached;
- A cloud, mist, fog, fine powder, dust, liquid, or oily residue with no explainable source;
- Two or more people experiencing difficulty breathing, uncontrollable coughing, collapse, seizure, nausea, blurred vision, or disorientation; or
- Small animals such as birds appearing to be dead or dying in the area.

Using this industry-based consensus[4] on the primary characteristics of people acting suspiciously and suspicious packages, devices, and substances, transportation systems have developed SOPs to direct how employees report (and supervisors investigate and manage) these events. Where possible, these SOPs attempt to answer the following questions, providing information essential for effective response:

- Specifically, what employees are looking for under heightened threat conditions, including the defining

[4] Federal Transit Administration and National Transit Institute, *Employee Guide to System Security*, March 2003. Additional information available at http://www.ntionline.com.

characteristics of suspicious/unusual/out-of-place activity or behavior, items, and substances;
- How employees can identify and report suspicious/unusual/out-of-place activity, items, and substances to supervisors and operations control, including the completion of forms documenting suspicious incidents;
- Recommended actions for employees and supervisors investigating, evaluating, and resolving these reports.
- How response to an investigated report, that results in something that cannot be explained, can be coordinated with local law enforcement and public safety/public health agencies to resolve the situation safely and prevent a potentially catastrophic incident while minimizing effects on service and local emergency resources and avoiding scaring public.

In implementing these SOPs, transportation systems emphasize strategies for heightening employee awareness to support recognition of potential security/terrorism event indicators before actual incidents. Other critical elements include protocols for effective communication of indicators to operations control and supervisors; rapid implementation of agency procedures for investigation, options analysis, and decision-making; and close coordination with local responders.

INCIDENT RESPONSE PROTOCOLS

Building on the transportation system's awareness program, the following material provides guidelines to assist transportation systems in developing protocols for managing threats, hoaxes, and reports of suspicious substances, packages, and activity. The following topics are addressed:

- Initial Considerations. This identifies topics that all transportation personnel responsible for receiving, evaluating, and responding to threats received by or reported to the system should consider.
- Telephone Threats. This details ways to manage threats received by phone.
- Written Threats/Letter and Package Threats. This provides procedures for handling threats to detonate explosive or release agents delivered to the system and for managing suspicious packages or letters received.
- Managing Passenger and Employee Reports of Suspicious Substances, Packages, and Activities. This discusses procedures for managing reports by passengers and employees based on the suspicious behavior of persons or suspicious packages or activities. These reports are critical to ensuring ongoing vigilance during heightened threat conditions and offer the system the best opportunity to address a threat before it results in an incident.

Initial Considerations

During response to threats and suspicious reports, it is strongly suggested that the system be prepared to make the following decisions:

- If and when to notify local law enforcement;
- If it will react to the threat/report or conduct business as usual;
- If it will cordon off and evacuate part of a station/pull a vehicle or consist from service;
- If a search will be conducted without evacuation using employee volunteers or in conjunction with local law enforcement;
- Under which conditions, if present, to initiate an evacuation of an administrative, passenger, or non-revenue facility;
- Under which conditions, if present, to initiate lockdown or shelter-in-place strategies in response to specific types of threats or conditions at specific facilities;
- How the system will provide passenger information and direct passenger activities for safe evacuation or sheltering;
- Under what conditions the system will request special-response resources (e.g., bomb squad, K9 unit, or hazardous materials unit);
- How the system will determine whether or not an evacuated facility is safe for re-entry; and
- How system personnel will coordinate with the media during both hoaxes and actual events.

When faced with a threat, it is strongly suggested that the primary concern always be the safety of passengers, employees, and emergency responders. Many transportation systems already have a disaster or emergency procedure for responding to smoke, fire, or medical emergencies in stations, administrative facilities, and shops/yards. Several elements of these procedures remain viable for managing threats and suspicious reports for explosives and suspected CBRN devices.

However, it is strongly suggested that other issues also be addressed. For example, in a fire, effort is directed at evacuating the occupants in a quick and orderly manner. For a bomb threat or suspected CBRN agent release, is it advisable for the exit routes and assembly areas to be searched before starting the evacuation? Terrorists may be trying to lure personnel into a location (e.g., stairwell or exit doorway) that is particularly vulnerable to collateral damage. On the other hand, delays may result in additional CBRN exposure and possible stampede-induced injuries and casualties.

Decisions made on whether a search should be performed, if the facility should be evacuated, or if lockdown or shelter-in-place procedures should be implemented are not easy. Transportation personnel volunteering to search the facility to determine if a device is present should recognize that they could be entering a dangerous situation and take appropriate

precautions. Decisions to evacuate vehicles and stations may bring unwelcome media attention and public scrutiny as well as affect transportation operations.

Only those with specific training in threat evaluation should make these decisions. Whenever possible, these decisions should be made in conjunction with local law enforcement. Each transportation system should determine where authority rests for these types of decisions and how these decisions will be communicated to employees and passengers. In fulfilling this obligation, systems have developed different approaches, relying on transit police, station managers, and senior operations personnel to evaluate the threat information and make decisions. It is likely that no single plan or procedure can be applied in all circumstances.

Evacuation plans typically are developed on the basis of a range of scenarios and needs. Many transportation organizations have adopted a color-coded evacuation system, whereby different evacuation plans, each with different exits and assembly points, are referenced by color. For example, the blue plan may indicate use of only one side exit, and assembly at four different sites no less than 300 feet from the facility. The red plan may be the standard fire evacuation plan, calling for use of all exits and assembly sites closer to the facility. Whatever approach is ultimately selected, it is desirable that evacuation plans and procedures

- Be flexible for different threats received by the facility;
- Be able to make evacuation decisions quickly;
- Have an effective communication system to relay the evacuation decision to all personnel within, approaching, or stationed near the exterior of the facility;
- Use evacuation distances suitable to the threat;
- Be well-rehearsed, effective, and responsive to requests from local responders;
- Ensure that sufficient attention is paid to employees and passengers who may require assistance during evacuation; and
- Ensure a buddy or other type of monitoring system, so that all evacuated personnel are identified at the assembly sites.

In some instances, depending on the threat received, evacuating a facility can place employees and passengers in greater danger than if they remained inside. The sniper attacks in the Washington, D.C., and northern Virginia area provided an example of a situation in which school districts, apparent sniper targets, chose to lock down their facilities in an attempt to control access to their students. In other situations, such as a threatened chemical agent release from a crop duster in an urban area, the most dangerous place to be is out on the street, where open exposure to agent release is assured. In this kind of situation, transportation personnel might choose to instruct their employees and passengers to remain inside facilities, stations, and vehicles.

- Shelter-in-place is generally used when there is danger from contaminants such as CBRN and other hazardous materials, or if an explosive device has detonated nearby and there is danger from falling debris. For example, if a transportation administrative facility receives a threat of chemical attack that is evaluated as serious, then it may be appropriate for decision-makers to initiate the system's shelter-in-place plan, calling for all employees to leave and secure their workstations, lock all windows and doors, and report to a designated location (cafeteria, break room, corridor, or other interior room). Transportation personnel would then initiate appropriate actions on the facility's heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system, and might shut and seal all windows and doors, using pre-cut plastic sheets and duct tape, and follow up to ensure that all employees had reported to the designated assembly site or have been accounted for (some employees may refuse to report to the shelter-in-place site, opting to disregard protocol and evacuate the facility instead). Whenever possible, it is desirable that the decision to shelter-in-place be closely coordinated with local responders, and a means be provided to remain in constant communication with them in the sheltering location.
- Lockdown is most likely to be used when there is an armed attacker outside a facility or some threat involving a perpetrator's desire to get into a facility. Lockdown involves the closing of all exits and entrances, ensuring that no one may enter or leave the facility. Depending on the situation, personnel and/or customers inside the facility may be asked to report to an interior room for an additional measure of protection. Similar protocols to sheltering-in-place are followed to ensure that every employee for whom reporting to the interior room is desired is actually there and that constant communication capability is maintained with local responders.

There is growing support in some sectors of the emergency response community for the use of sheltering-in-place as an appropriate response to certain types of bomb threats. Situations where this may be appropriate include

- Threats or actual explosions occurring at facilities near a transportation facility whose destruction may produce considerable fragmentation and debris in or near assembly areas;
- Threats resulting from small suspicious packages when conditions indicate that employee assembly areas may not be safe; and
- Threats where there may not be time for facility evacuation.

Sheltering-in-place is never recommended for situations in which a suspected device has been identified with massive destructive power and is directly targeted at the transportation facility.

Transportation structures, in many instances, may be ideally suited to fulfill sheltering functions. If a system is considering this procedure, it is critical that a structural engineer with appropriate experience in blast damage assessment be consulted to identify shelter-in-place locations. For explosive threats, typical recommendations include an interior room on the lowest floor with no windows. Ideally, at least two solid walls should be between the sheltering location and the suspected device or nearby facility with the potential to produce collateral damage. Personnel should be instructed to remain away from doorways, windows, mirrors, glass, and corners of rooms. Reflected blast pressure and fragmentation are most likely to occur near these locations. Typical procedures on employee and passenger monitoring and open communications with local responders also apply to sheltering-in-place. CBRN releases typically are heavier than air, so sheltering-in-place at higher floors is preferable.

Threats

Threats are transmitted to a transportation system in several ways:

- Telephone;
- Written letters and packages; and
- Reports from passengers or employees.

Procedures for managing each of these are discussed below.

Telephone Threats

When a telephone threat is received, various situations are possible. The caller may

- Know that a device has been planted (he/she could be the perpetrator, an acquaintance, or someone who has come by the information from the perpetrator or another source);
- Be a prankster wanting to disrupt public transportation and/or paratransit operations;
- Be considering planting a device or acting out a fantasy;
- Be conducting a test to evaluate response measures; or
- Be a passenger, employee, or former employee attempting to disrupt operations and/or get revenge for an actual or perceived slight.

Noting what is said and how it is said during a threat call can help management assess the severity of the threat and guide an appropriate reaction from the system. The person receiving the call may be the only person to ever have contact with the potential bomber/terrorist.

Ideally, trained transportation dispatchers who may have the capability to record them and to identify the number from which the call was made should manage these calls. However, often, the caller will not dial the operations control center, but may attempt to reach the system's Executive Director or General Manager, board members, or operating management personnel. Ideally, executive assistants and others who may take calls for these professionals should be trained on what to do and how to do it, so that valuable information will not be lost. Proper training provides each potential receiver of such calls with the skills to identify and document key facts.

When it is not possible to transfer the caller to the operations control center, signaling another employee to listen in on the call can be a useful backup and ideally should be worked out in advance. The second person concentrates on the characteristics of the caller and any background noises. The receiver of the call concentrates on the exact words of the caller. Ideally, the person receiving the call should be prepared to obtain precise information, including the following:

- The time the call was received and on which telephone number or extension;
- The exact words of the person making the threat;
- Whether the caller was male or female and an approximate age;
- Any accent or speech impediment or slurring of speech, which could indicate intoxication or an unbalanced condition;
- Background noises (e.g., traffic, music, or other voices); and
- Familiar voice or use of expressions commonly used by employees (rather than the general public).

Ideally, persons receiving threatening calls should be prepared to ask callers certain questions if the information has not been volunteered. The caller may provide specific information by answering these questions. Sometimes, the person making a threat becomes so involved in the conversation that he or she will answer questions impulsively, including questions on his or her identity, address, or phone number. Any information obtained will be helpful to police and explosive technicians. To assist the person receiving the call, it is suggested that a printed form be readily available.

A sample form, developed by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), is provided in Table 7-2.[5] Typically, this checklist is modified as appropriate for the transportation system and kept readily available for the dispatcher(s) or other personnel most likely to receive such a threat.

If a threat is serious, notification of law enforcement should be prompt and include as much detail as possible. Ideally, the person who received the threatening call should be available for immediate interviewing, and copies of the completed

[5] This checklist is no longer available online. Persons wishing to receive the checklist must send in a written request to: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Arson and Explosives Programs Division, 800 K Street, NW, Tech World Suite 710, Washington, DC 20001.

TABLE 7-2 Telephone threat evaluation worksheet

1. EXACT TIME AND DATE OF CALL: _____

2. EXACT WORDS OF CALLER:

3. CALLER TRAITS AND BACKGROUND NOISES:

Voice	Accent	Manner	Background Noise
❑ Loud	❑ Local	❑ Calm	❑ Factory Machines
❑ High Pitched	❑ Foreign	❑ Rational	❑ Bedlam
❑ Raspy	❑ Race	❑ Coherent	❑ Music
❑ Intoxicated	❑ Not Local	❑ Deliberate	❑ Office Machines
❑ Soft	❑ Region	❑ Righteous	❑ Mixed
❑ Deep		❑ Angry	❑ Street Traffic
❑ Pleasant		❑ Irrational	❑ Trains
❑ Other	**Speech**	❑ Incoherent	❑ Animals
	❑ Fast	❑ Emotional	❑ Quiet
Language	❑ Distinct	❑ Laughing	❑ Voices
❑ Excellent	❑ Stutter		❑ Airplanes
❑ Fair	❑ Slurred	**Familiarity With Threatened Facility**	❑ Party Atmosphere
❑ Foul	❑ Slow		❑ Other:_____
❑ Good	❑ Distorted	❑ Much	❑ Other:_____
❑ Poor	❑ Nasal	❑ Some	❑ Other:_____
❑ Other	❑ Lisp	❑ None	❑ Other:_____
	❑ Other		❑ Other:_____

QUESTIONS TO ASK THE CALLER

1. When is the device going off?
2. Where is the device?
3. What does it look like?
4. What kind of device is it?
5. What will cause it to go off?
6. Did you place the device?
7. Why did you place the device?
8. Where are you calling from?
9. What is your address?
10. How can I reach you?
11. What is your name?

OBSERVATIONS

1. If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?
2. Were there any background noises?
3. Were words and phrases used that would only be known by employees or others familiar with the operation?
4. Telephone number call received at:_____
5. Person receiving call: _____
6. Was call recorded? _____
7. Any additional remarks:

threat checklist should be readily available to all who may need it.

If operations control was unable to receive, trace, or record the call, use of caller identification functions (such as *69) can provide the number from which the call was made; however, this feature is not available on certain phone systems used in large administrative facilities.

Training provided by the ATF, local law enforcement, NTI, and the TSI can support preparation of procedures for managing telephone threats and subsequent actions. These organizations can be reached respectively at

- http://www.atf.treas.gov/;
- http://www.ntionline.gov; and
- http://www.tsi.dot.gov/.

Evaluating Telephone Threats

All threatening calls can be categorized as either non-specific or specific. Non-specific threat calls are the most common—usually little information is given other than that there is a bomb in the facility. In the case of specific threat calls, the threat is more detailed, and reference is often made to the exact location of the device or the time at which it will detonate.

Specific threats should be considered more serious and require a more concerted effort in the response than non-specific threats. Non-specific threats, however, cannot be ignored. As indicated in Table 7-3, ideally, a policy should be developed to respond to both specific and non-specific threats.

Depending on the results of the evaluation, the appropriate search procedure should be initiated. Searches in the transportation environment, as in many other environments, have two major constraints:

- Radio communication cannot be used (it may detonate the device); and
- The environment is often specialized, therefore, it cannot be searched effectively by outsiders.

In order to address these constraints, personnel who work in a particular area or are responsible for an area should be used. Generally, these personnel can execute a more thorough search than outside responders, know about station or facility emergency communication systems, and can access landline telephones to manage communications more effectively during the search. It is strongly suggested that, if evacuations have been ordered and systems use employees for searches, such systems should always use only volunteers.

Factors favoring a search before the movement of personnel (occupant search) include the following:

- There is/has been a high incidence of hoax telephone threats;
- Effective security arrangements have been established;
- Information in the warning is imprecise or incorrect;
- The caller sounded intoxicated, amused, or very young; or
- The prevailing threat of terrorist activity is low.

Factors favoring the movement of personnel before searching (volunteer search) include the following:

TABLE 7-3 Evaluating telephone threats

After the caller hangs up, it is suggested that the receiver
- Notify transportation dispatch (if call was not answered/transferred there);
- Notify transportation police, security personnel, and supervisory personnel in the affected station/area (if possible);
- Deliver a completed threat worksheet to the supervisor; and
- Remain available to transportation management/police/supervisors to answer questions.

After being notified, it is suggested that public transportation management, police, security, or supervisory personnel
- Evaluate the threat worksheet; and
- Make a decision regarding if the threat is specific enough to warrant further action.

If threat warrants additional action, it is desirable for the transportation system to
- Notify local law enforcement;
- Consider options for searching;
- Consider options for evacuation, lock-down, or shelter-in-place; and
- Execute one of the following options --
  - Search before evacuation of personnel (employee search),
  - Search after evacuation of personnel (volunteer search),
  - Search prior to lock-down or shelter-in-place, or

  concurrent searches by volunteer teams while remaining employees initiate lock-down or shelter-in-place procedures.

- The area is comparatively open;
- Information in the warning is precise as to the matters of location, a description of the device, the timing, and the motive for the attack; and
- A prevailing threat of terrorist activity is high.

Telephone Threat Response, Search Procedure

Pre-planning and coordination of employees are essential in implementing an effective search of transportation premises, particularly for large stations and facilities. A central control mechanism is necessary to ensure a thorough and complete response. Ideally, a printed station and/or facility schematic should be identified for each major transportation facility. Wherever possible, divide stations into zones or sections (before the actual conduct of the search), and identify volunteer personnel familiar with that zone or section to support the search. Identify backups and supporting volunteers for each zone or segment. Make a compendium of station/facility schematics available to those responsible for managing bomb threats and searches. These schematics will support identification and assembly of the volunteer search team and, as the search is conducted, each completed area can be crossed off the plan.

Areas accessible to the public require special attention during a search and may be vitally important if an evacuation is to be conducted. Ideally, the intensity of the search should be appropriate for the perceived threat level. For example

- An occupant search is used when the credibility of a specific threat is low. Occupants quickly search their own areas because they are most likely to notice anything unusual.
- A volunteer team search is used when the credibility of a specific threat is high. The search is very thorough and places the minimum number of personnel at risk. Evacuate the area completely, and ensure that it remains evacuated until the search is completed. Search teams will make a slow, thorough, systematic search, crossing off completed areas on designated schematics as they go.

Historically, the following areas have been used to conceal explosive or hoax devices in the transportation environment as depicted in Table 7-4.

Depending on the threat, searches may expand to include transportation vehicles. Dispatchers have instructed operators on certain bus routes or rail lines to immediately bring their vehicles/consists to a safe location, evacuate passengers, and walk through the vehicle while looking for unidentified packages. In other instances, law enforcement officers, who actually conduct the search, including the vehicle undercarriage and rooftop areas, have met evacuated vehicles.

Telephone Threat Response, Locating A Suspicious Package

If an unidentified or suspicious object is found, personnel should be instructed not to move it and to report it to the operations control center or the search team immediately. The following information is essential:

- Location;
- Reason(s) suspected;
- Description; and
- Any other useful information, e.g., how difficult is it to secure the area or to evacuate, the distance to the nearest emergency exits, etc.

Based on this information, decisions will be made about the following:

- Removal of persons at risk;
- Establishment of perimeter control of the area to ensure that no one approaches or attempts to move the object;

TABLE 7-4 Locations for concealed devices

Outside Station Areas	Inside Stations
• Trash receptacles • Dumpsters • Mailboxes • Bushes or shrubbery • Street drainage systems • Storage areas • Parked cars • Parked transportation vehicles • Other vehicles • Newspaper Stands • Temporary structures • Behind, under and around sculptures	• Ceilings with removable panels • Overhead nooks • Areas behind artwork and benches • Recently repaired/patched segments of walls, floors, or ceilings • Elevator shafts • Restrooms • Behind access doors • In crawl spaces • Behind electrical fixtures • In storage areas and utility rooms • Mail rooms • Fire hose racks

- Activities to establish ownership of the object (if legitimate property has been left behind in error before the bomb threat being received);
- Assignment of someone familiar with the building and the area where the object is located to meet the explosives disposal unit (EDU) personnel on their arrival (if they have been called); and
- Continuing implementation of the search procedure until all areas have reported to the operations control center, because there may be more than one unidentified object.

At this time, the seriousness of the incident has significantly increased. Transportation personnel should

- Treat the area as a crime scene and disturb nothing;
- Ensure law enforcement/EDU has been notified and is arriving;
- Consider whether or not, depending on the telephone threat, PPE or decontamination is needed and whether fire services and/or hazmat response is needed; and
- Consider whether or not to notify the local medical health officer/public health department.

While volunteers and public safety personnel are conducting the search, and particularly while they are managing response to a suspicious package, they should keep in mind the following information.

The four general rules to follow to avoid injury from a suspected improvised explosive device (IED) or WMD dispersal device are

1. Move as far from a suspicious object as possible without being in further danger from other hazards (such as traffic or a live third rail);
2. Stay out of the object's line-of-sight, thereby reducing the hazard of injury because of direct fragmentation;
3. Keep away from glass windows or other materials that could become flying debris; and
4. Remain alert for leakage, spray, mist, or other indications that the device is active.

Historically, perpetrators of bombings in the transportation environment (in foreign countries such as Israel, France, India, and England) have used two tactics that intensify the magnitude of casualties inflicted by detonation of an IED:

- Perpetrators have detonated a small device to bring public safety personnel to the site, and a larger, more deadly device is detonated some time after the first, thereby inflicting heavy casualties on the first-responder community and seriously weakening its ability to respond appropriately to additional events.
- Perpetrators have used a real or simulated device to force evacuation of a facility only to detonate a much more substantial device in identified bomb-threat evacuation assembly areas. These attacks are especially harmful because the evacuation assembly areas often concentrate transportation personnel and passengers more densely than would otherwise be the case.

Bomb threat standoff distances are provided in Table 7-5 and are discussed below.

TABLE 7-5 Terrorist bomb threat standoff distances

THREAT	THREAT DESCRIPTION	EXPLOSIVE CAPACITY	LETHAL AIRBLAST RANGE	MANDATORY EVACUATION DISTANCE	DESIRED EVACUATION DISTANCE
	Pipe Bomb	5 LBS / 2.3 KG	25 FT / 8 M	70 FT / 21 M	850 FT / 259 M
	Briefcase or Suitcase Bomb	50 LBS / 23 KG	40 FT / 12 M	150 FT / 46 M	1,850 FT / 564 M
	Compact Sedan	220 LBS / 100 KG	60 FT / 18 M	240 FT / 73 M	915 FT / 279 M
	Sedan	500 LBS / 227 KG	100 FT / 30 M	320 FT / 98 M	1,050 FT / 320 M
	Van	1,000 LBS / 454 KG	125 FT / 38 M	400 FT / 122 M	1,200 FT / 366 M
	Moving Van or Delivery Truck	4,000LBS / 1,814KG	200 FT / 61 M	640 FT / 195 M	1,750 FT / 534 M
	Semi-Trailer	40,000 LBS / 18,144 KG	450FT / 137M	1,400FT / 427M	3,500FT / 1,607M

- Explosive Capacity is based on the maximum volume or weight of explosives (TNT equivalent) that could reasonably fit or be hidden in a suitcase or vehicle.
- Lethal Airblast Range is the minimum distance personnel in the open are expected to survive blast effects. This minimum range is based on anticipation of avoiding severe lung damage or fatal impact injury from body translation.
- Mandatory Evacuation Distance is the range within which it is strongly suggested that all buildings be evacuated. From this range out to the Desired Evacuation Distance, personnel may remain inside buildings but away from windows and exterior walls. Whenever possible, evacuated personnel should move at least the desired evacuation distance.

Telephone Threat Response, Evacuation Procedure

If an unidentified object is found, it is advisable to conduct a quiet and systematic evacuation from the area. Before evacuation, if possible, all areas used in the evacuation route should be searched: stairwells, corridors, elevators, and doorways. When these areas have been checked and determined to be safe, assign volunteer personnel to direct others along the searched exit routes.

Generally, evacuation should be conducted, at a minimum, for a distance of 300 feet in all directions from the suspicious package, including the area above and below the site, giving regard to the type of building construction (e.g., thin walls or glass) and the size of the suspicious package. Do not use elevators to evacuate people under normal circumstances, because a power failure could leave them trapped in a hazardous area. Pay attention to the need for special transportation for persons with disabilities and people of age.

The goal of evacuation is to direct people to leave the premises quietly, using tact and power of suggestion, to maintain control and avoid alarm. Once a complete or partial evacuation has taken place, account for all personnel and passengers. This may be difficult or tedious, but necessary to ensure the safety of everyone. Ideally, persons familiar with personnel should be assigned to ensuring that all have been accounted for.

Ideally, assembly areas should be pre-selected and well known to personnel who work in a given transportation facility. Establish a clearly defined procedure for controlling, marshalling, and checking personnel within the assembly area. If possible, for major transportation stations, assembly areas should be coordinated with local police in advance. Ideally, assembly areas should

- Be at least 300 feet from the likely target or building (if possible).
- Offer little chance of a secondary device being hidden. Open spaces are best. Avoid parking areas because devices can be hidden easily in vehicles.
- Reduce the likelihood of ambush with a second device or small arms fire. Always search the assembly area before personnel occupy the space.
- Be away from expanses of plate glass or windows. Blast effects can cause windows to be sucked out rather than blown in.

If possible, select multiple assembly areas to reduce the concentration of key personnel. Drill and exercise personnel to go to various assembly areas to avoid developing an evacuation and emergency pattern that can be used by perpetrators to attack key, identifiable personnel.

Telephone Threat Response, Final Steps

The decision to re-occupy a building should be made by an appropriate transportation system or law enforcement official. If the evacuation was made without a search, it is strongly advisable that the premises be searched before re-occupation.

The last step is completion of an after-action report and debriefing session. This activity enables involved parties to determine what exactly happened, assess what went well and what did not, and identify possible improvements in procedures.

Written Threats/Letter and Package Threats

Written threats or suspicious packages delivered to the system may

- Be more serious than phoned-in threats;
- Be more difficult to trace than phoned-in threats;
- Serve various purposes, but, generally, are directed at specific personnel rather than at the system as a whole; and
- Rely more on the personal motivations of the perpetrator.

The likelihood of receiving a package or letter containing suspicious substances is remote. However, transportation employees should be made aware of characteristics common to suspicious packages. Some indicators, identified by the U.S. Postal Service, include, but are not limited to, the following:[6]

- Unusual balance or shape;
- Excessive weight for its size;
- Excessive or unusual wrapping or sealing;
- A lopsided/protruding item, or suspicious parts showing through the wrapping;

[6] More information is available at: http://www.usps.com/news/2001/press/pr01_1010tips.htm.

- Oil stains on the wrapping;
- Excessive postage;
- A strange odor emanating from the package;
- Unusual or overly suspicious instructions, such as open only on this end or instructions that only a specific individual should open;
- No return address; and/or
- Similarity to other packages recently reported in the media or law enforcement threat briefings.

Suspect Envelopes or Packages

- Do not open, smell, or taste.
- Do not shake or empty the contents.
- Set the package or envelope aside for review.
- Promptly notify a supervisor.

Packages with Identified Threats, Powder, or Suspicious Content

- Do not panic.
- Do not touch, move or cover the substance or object.
- If the package or envelope has been opened or partially opened, stop handling it, and gently put it down on the top of a desk or in another open area. Do not place in a trashcan or in a cupboard, but leave it accessible for emergency responders.
- Remain calm and evacuate everyone from the affected area.
- Close off the affected area, if possible, by shutting doors and windows.
- Avoid further contamination by isolating and securing the area. It is strongly suggested that no one be allowed into the room until responders arrive.
- Notify a supervisor, who will route requests through the operations control center to immediately contact the Postal Inspection Service, local police, public health, or a pre-determined designated contact.
- Do not brush off clothes.
- Remove clothing carefully and place it in a plastic bag, as soon as possible. Close the bag and place the bag in a second plastic bag. Clearly label and identify the contents, and retain the bag for law enforcement, as it may be evidence.
- Shower with soap and water as soon as possible. Do not use bleach or other disinfectant. Do not break the skin.
- Put on fresh clothing.
- Make a list of all people (including names, addresses, and phone numbers) who had contact with the powder, oil, or substance, and give the list to local public health authorities. Potentially affected individuals may be instructed to watch for fever or other symptoms over the next couple of days.
- Ensure that all persons who have touched the mail item wash their hands with soap and water.
- Postal inspectors will collect the mail, assess the threat situation, and coordinate with the FBI. Designated officials will notify local, county, and state health departments. Designated officials will also notify the state emergency manager, if appropriate.
- Initiate the transportation system's procedures on Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems to avoid spreading contamination throughout the facility.
- Call the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency Response at 770-488-7100 for answers to any questions on suspicious substances.

Managing Passenger and Employee Reports of Suspicious Substances, Packages and Activities

Unlike telephone threats and threats involving mail or delivered packages, passenger and employee reports can be delivered to anyone at the agency: station managers, vehicle operators, maintenance personnel, and even contractors. How the agency manages these reports is critical to its activities to support enhanced awareness under changing threat conditions.

If a passenger reports a suspicious substance, package, or activity, the employee receiving the threat should notify his or her supervisor immediately. The supervisor would then contact transportation operations control. After receiving a complete report from the passenger or employee, the supervisor should investigate the report.

Situational awareness is critical to effective investigation of these reports. Transportation personnel should remain vigilant. There may be times, in response to external events, when the system receives an elevated number of threats/hoaxes and false reports arising from heightened public sensitivity and suspicion. During these periods, transportation personnel should be cautious not to become desensitized to the possibility of an actual event.

A central feature of these procedures is identification of the suspicious material or activity. Although this may seem obvious, it is often overlooked. Initiating a public safety response for every suspicious substance or package depletes limited community resources. These calls also bring public health officials to the scene, which may result in unnecessary station closures or evacuations. These events may bring increased media attention and create public fear and concern.

On the other hand, blanket procedures involving immediate removal of any spilled or out-of-place item may put maintenance personnel, passengers, and other employees in danger. Early recognition of harmless substances and items is essential in limiting disruptions and protecting passengers and employees.

Adopt the following general rules and observations as needed to minimize the number of incidents that require responses from external agencies.

1. Prepare a list of typical non-hazardous substances that may be found in the public transportation environment that resemble chemical and biological substances.

Such substances include cleaning residue, food residue (e.g., powdered sugar), concrete dust, oils and lubricants, and spilled soda or other liquids. Attention stemming from the anthrax mailings in the fall of 2001 spurred increased numbers of passenger reports on white powder in stations, on vehicles, and in facilities. Other external events may bring increased attention to other types of substances. Update this list as necessary.

2. For situations where suspicious activity or behavior has been identified, provide a clear policy for how to manage them.

For example, transportation personnel and supervisors may be urged to take the following steps when encountering persons who are unfamiliar and in areas where they should not be or acting in ways that are disturbing to those around them:

- When deciding on how to respond, ONLY approach someone if it feels comfortable and safe.
- Offer assistance and calmly ask
  - For an identification card or badge;
  - If they need help;
  - Who they are there to see; and/or
  - If you can escort them to an appropriate area for waiting.
- Avoid
  - Approaching threatening or dangerous persons;
  - Being aggressive, confrontational, abusive, or offensive; and
  - Detaining or holding a person by any means.
- Stay alert and observe their location, activity, behavior, and physical characteristics. Try to keep them within sight at all times.
- Report any incidents of suspicious behavior or activity through appropriate channels. Include the location in which you found such persons, particularly if it is a secure area that may have been compromised. If they do leave, note their description, direction of travel, and description of vehicle and license plate number (if available).
- When observing suspicious activity, report the person's following characteristics:
  - Head. Eyes, ears, hair, and facial hair, mouth, nose, forehead, cheeks and chin, complexion, jewelry, glasses, or hat.
  - Body. Neck, arms, chest, stomach, tattoos, shirt/blouse/dress, coat, accessories.
  - Legs. Pants, skirt, belt, feet, socks, shoes.
  - Overall appearance. Height, weight, build, gender, neat or sloppy, packages, bags or accessories.
  - Unique characteristics. Scars, birthmarks, or other identifying attributes.

3. Remember that passengers and employees observe many activities in the transportation environment.

They are the eyes and ears of the system. Passengers will assess how seriously their concerns are taken by the system and will report perceived laxness to their friends, co-workers, family, and potentially the media. Unfavorable remarks can negatively affect ridership as well as future reporting. Employees will make similar assessments on their perceptions of management commitment to safety and security. To ensure that security and awareness remain priorities, transportation management should consider regular briefings, bulletins, or training sessions for front line employees, supervisors, and station managers on the system's protocol for receiving and investigating reports of suspicious activities, behavior, substances, devices, and packages. Transportation personnel need to understand what is expected of them, and just as important, in what actions they probably should not engage. For example, employees encountering a report of a suspicious package or device should:

- NOT use a radio or cell phone if they suspect an explosive device.
- Make notification through appropriate channels and give a description of the package or device and its exact location.
- NOT touch, move, or cover the object.
- If there appears to be immediate danger, remain calm and evacuate the area.
- Attempt to isolate and secure the area.
- NOT re-enter once the area has been evacuated.
- Await direction from a transportation supervisor, the operations control center, or emergency responders.

These simple steps can save lives and reinforce the system's commitment to the safety and security of passengers and employees.

4. Develop a report form specifically for people acting suspiciously and for suspicious behaviors, packages, devices, and substances that may be related to security.

An example, suspicious condition reporting form is provided in Table 7-6.

Responses to incidents involving suspicion should be managed carefully. To avoid public alarm and disruptive response calls to local fire services, HAZMAT teams, and explosive ordnance disposal units (bomb squads), the system should develop procedures to guide response to and investigation of these situations.

Recommendations for procedures that can be used for addressing suspicious conditions reports potentially related to terrorism are provided in the sample report form in Figure

TABLE 7-6 Suspicious condition report

SUSPICIOUS CONDITION REPORT

Reported by: _____
Date and Time of Incident: _____
Incident Location: _____
Incident Description: _____

Reported Condition (Circle all that apply)

Unusual liquid or droplets, mist or oily film	Unusual debris from unidentified source	Unusual sickness affecting two or more persons
Unusual odors	Abandoned spray devices	Unusual animal/insect patterns
Unusual cloud or vapor	Unexplained munitions	Unusual activity observed
Other (describe):		

Weather

Clear	Cloudy	Snow
Misty	Rain	Temperature: _____
Relative humidity:_____	Other: _____	

Wind

Direction (to/from):
Speed (none, mild, gusts, high winds):
Other (describe):

Odor (Circle all that apply)

None	Sweet	Flower	Fresh hay
Unfamiliar	Pepper	Forest	Rotten eggs
Garlic/horseradish	Fruity	Almond/peach	Swimming pool
Other (describe):			

Visible Emission (Circle all that apply)

Cloud	Mist	Liquid	Unexplained fog
Vapor	Smoke	Oil	
Other (describe):			

Signs and Symptoms (Circle all that apply)

None	Stinging of skin	Dizziness	Welts/blisters
Tightness in chest	Reddening of skin	Blurred vision	Nausea/vomiting
Fever	Runny nose	Choking	Diarrhea
Dry mouth	Excessive saliva	Collapse	Seizures
Other (describe):			

Date and Time of Onset: _____

7-5. These recommendations were developed as a reflection of a series of situations typically encountered in a rail transit station, but could be readily applied to any type of public transportation vehicle or bus or ferry terminal.

Suspicious Condition Report, Readily Resolved

Suspicious condition reports typically are about trespassers, loiterers, lost children or adults, passenger medical emergencies, equipment malfunctions in service; and housekeeping issues in stations and facilities. When responding to these reports, transportation supervisors, law enforcement/security personnel, station managers, and other transportation personnel may be called on to investigate any of the following sample circumstances:

- An individual was overheard making a specific threat to contaminate a facility, vehicle or other location;
- An individual was observed with what appeared to be a gas mask or protective equipment walking through the station or on the vehicle;
- An individual was observed with a device appearing to be dispersing something in the air or appearing to be capable of dispersing something;
- A discarded spray device, gas mask, or item of PPE was observed;
- A trash can, sculpture, bench, or plant appears to be steaming and releasing mist or smoke into the air;
- A briefcase, suitcase, box, or other item appears to have been abandoned (it may or may not be leaking suspicious material or be strangely wrapped as described by the U.S. Postal service);
- A suspicious powdered or liquid substance is on turnstiles, seats, the station floor, in a bathroom, or by an entryway/exit;
- A strange odor has been detected on a vehicle or in a station; and/or

TABLE 7-6 (Continued)

Duration of Symptom(s): _____
Number of Casualties: _____

Explosion/Fires (Circle all that apply)

None	Structure
Air	Underground
On-ground	Other:_____

Describe device: _____
Describe container/condition/size: _____
Describe location where device was found: _____
Describe structures involved/estimated damage: _____
_____

WHEN FILING THIS REPORT, USE THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES

- Protect by using a safe approach.
- Identify and recognize hazards.
- Isolate the area / secure the scene.
- Set up command / request additional help (if necessary or when in doubt).
- Remember that unsubstantiated rumors or opinions can generate panic.
- Be aware of people arriving or departing the scene.
- Advise witnesses and bystanders to remain at the scene in a safe location until the situation has been resolved/law enforcement has arrived.
- Note physical evidence, such as footprints, wrappers, or matches, and notify authorities of such findings but do not touch them.
- State if additional investigation is required by law enforcement/public safety, including sketching, photographing, or videotaping the scene.

Remember the Rule: Do not touch, disturb, or remove anything until it has been established that the material is not hazardous.

EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES

- Blot off the agent, using dirt, rags, paper, or other available material. Be careful not to break the skin.
- Strip off all clothing.
- Flush affected area with large amounts of water.
- Cover affected area and remain warm until first responders arrive.

FEDERAL CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL HOTLINE: (800) 424-8802

- Several people on a vehicle or in one part of a station are beginning to complain about similar symptoms that have visited them suddenly.

Each of these reports could have a logical explanation not related to the dispersal of WMD agents. Each of these events, however, and particularly the last four, could also be precursors to a more serious incident.

Typically, transportation personnel assigned to investigate these reports will already be stationed near the event. These personnel will often be expected to assess the situation and make decisions on its likely severity. They may be called on to recommend appropriate action. In this capacity, these personnel may initiate a station evacuation; decommission a vehicle from service; or activate the system's emergency alert and notification system. These personnel may also be called on to (1) provide critical information for situation reports (i.e., incident size-ups) and preliminary recommendations for staging areas for arriving local responders, and (2) engage and brief arriving units.

Generally, unusual and non-routine event reports will involve an unknown substance, a suspicious or out-of-place package, or suspicious activity that can be investigated safely and resolved quickly. However, until the report is confirmed as a minor occurrence, misunderstanding, or hoax, many dangers could exist for those transportation personnel who investigate.

Often, the supervisor may be able, from a safe vantage point, to determine that suspicious powder reported for investigation is actually sawdust from a recent construction project at that location or residue from a recent station cleaning or that the discarded spray device is actually a lubricant dropped by maintenance personnel. A group of fourth graders, on a field trip, may have spilled soda on the turnstile or station floor, and the local high school may be having its annual science fair, flooding the system with strange-looking apparatus.

If the supervisor can identify the suspicious substance, item, or activity, he or she should

- Notify operations control the report has been resolved and no hazardous materials are involved;

- Ensure the area is cleaned or that the suspicious package or device is removed; and
- If the notifying passenger is still available, thank him or her for the attention and concern and describe the situation.

Suspicious Condition Report, Not Resolved (With No Symptoms)

In other cases, a more serious response may be required. When the supervisor has identified a substance or package that cannot be explained, the supervisor should

- Notify the operations control center that an unidentified substance or package has been confirmed and request that law enforcement or specially trained transportation agency resources be dispatched;
- Cordon off and evacuate the area (to at least 25 feet);
- Question additional transportation personnel to ascertain if anything out of the ordinary occurred in the location;
- Request a status update on the station ventilation system;
- Monitor persons closest to the substance/package for the onset of symptoms; and
- Await the response of law enforcement or transportation personnel.

If the dispatched responders cannot identify the substance/package, then a public safety response should be initiated, including fire services; EMS; hazardous materials unit; EDU; local and state health departments, and the FBI field office. At this point, probably a series of response actions should occur that would probably require evacuation of the station and suspension of transportation service to and through the station. Depending on the location of the package or substance, slowed vehicle traffic (5 mph or less) may still be allowed through the station. Evacuation protocols should include securing perimeter control, establishing passenger communication, and maintaining a keen lookout for secondary devices. A thorough search of the station or facility may also be required in order to rule out the presence of other devices.

If responders believe a suspicious package is a potential WMD device, they will evaluate the device for explosives and for potential CBRN materials. If it is confirmed that the device contains potential WMD materials or supplements, then, ideally, local responders will

- Follow protocols for documentation of the crime scene;
- Contain the package following recommendations from the HAZMAT unit (options include double bagging, steel cans, poly containment vessels, or use of a HAZMAT over-pack);
- Control the material as evidence and ensure rapid laboratory analysis; and
- Work with the transportation agency to develop plans for
  - Identifying and notifying those passengers and employees who may have been in the station before and shortly after identification of the device,
  - Communicating with the media about the event, and
  - Cleaning the site and restoring the station or facility to service, or keeping the station/facility closed and secure pending the results of the analysis.

Follow-up with passengers potentially exposed to the device, material, or agent will be crucial, as will be ongoing coordination with local responders and communication with the media.

Suspicious Condition Report, Not Resolved (With Symptoms or Strong Indicators)

If passengers or employees are exhibiting symptoms, a suspicious package is leaking liquid, or an unusual and unexpected odor is in the air, even more serious initial response measures should be considered such as

- Immediate notification of law enforcement, fire services, EMS, HAZMAT unit, and the EDU;
- Full public health notification (based on local operations plans and procedures);
- Station evacuation (to a safe location, away from air vents, pre-screened for secondary devices, and secured through appropriate perimeter control);
- Identification of persons in the at-risk area, not releasing them until they are appropriately evaluated by medical/public health professionals;
- Vehicle re-routing or slowing (to a speed of 5 mph or less) through the station/facility area until responders arrive;
- Suspension of service to and from the station or facility once responders arrive and until the incident is resolved;
- Notification to passengers that, because of police action, a particular station or facility will be bypassed and is no longer in service; and
- Provision of alternate transportation for passengers (as necessary).

In assessing response to an unexpected and potentially catastrophic situation, transportation personnel should consider the following:

- Weather conditions, wind direction, atmospheric conditions, and time of day are elements that will be vitally important to first responders in planning their emergency operations and are critical in selecting an appropriate evacuation site.
- Evacuation to a safe location (upwind, uphill of station, and air vents/vehicle) and then waiting for arriving responders is likely to minimize potential exposure and avoid casualties.

- To ensure that cross-contamination does not occur at the evacuation site, separate those who may have been exposed to the suspected release or material from those that were not (by at least 50 feet, with potentially exposed victims located downhill and downwind of other evacuated persons). Such separation also ensures priority medical treatment for those who were exposed.
- Ideally, evacuated persons should be reassured. This is necessary to avoid potentially affected victims from leaving the scene, panicking, and creating chaos for the arriving responders, as well as unnecessary secondary contamination. Reinforce to evacuees that no one who is able to walk and talk is in immediate danger of loss of life and that trained responders and medical personnel will be arriving shortly.
- Maintaining perimeter control so that no one unwittingly enters a hazardous situation or crime scene and that potentially affected victims do not leave the evacuation site. Depending on transportation procedures and the presence of transportation police, the initial transportation CP can be established.
- Situational assessment helps establish the required resources. Emergency responders will need to know the number of apparent victims, the types of injuries and symptoms presented (potentially none if it is a biological incident), and the type of exposure.
- An event description is necessary to provide responders with information from witnesses (what they saw and heard) and to support assessments on the presence of secondary devices.
- Staging information is important to provide safe access routes and staging areas for arriving responders.
- An inventory of available resources is necessary to identify nearby sources of water or facilities that could support decontamination (this is particularly important in cold weather).
- The site is a crime scene. Secure evidence. If possible, identify the names and contact information of all evacuated persons, using the system's standard procedures and forms (e.g., accident courtesy cards), because these individuals may have valuable information for responders.

Important elements of this checklist are shown in Figures 7-5 and 7-6. Table 7-7 provides suggestions for transportation personnel investigating the scene of a probable WMD incident. To support the capabilities of transportation personnel to perform these activities, the transportation system should consider building on planning activities previously performed to ensure that the right resources will be delivered to the correct location in an orderly and controlled manner. These activities may include

- Identification of pre-determined staging areas and creation of plans of major stations and sites served by the public transportation agency, including street addresses and directions for controllers/dispatchers to convey to responders.
- Development of playbooks or notebooks for stations and major facilities to direct emergency response and coordination with location responders. Such notebooks should include
  - Location or address and nearby businesses and resources;
  - Type of facility and typical uses by employees and passengers;
  - Daytime and nighttime populations;
  - 24-hour points of contact;
  - Voice, pager, beeper, and email information for facility;
  - Unique hazards in facility (e.g., traction power third rail, HAZMAT storage);
  - Threat history;
  - Floor plans and lay-out;
  - Photos (e.g., ground level, aerial, key exits and entrances, staging areas);
  - HVAC system characteristics;
  - Procedures for controlling ventilation in response to toxic material release;
  - Location of vents to street level and air out-take locations;
  - Communications capabilities, accounting for radio dead spots and emergency phones; and
  - Location of equipment rooms and available power, water, and lighting (both primary and backup).
- Implementation of pre-determined mobilization plans, coordinated with local law enforcement and community planning agencies, on the delivery of equipment and personnel to sites away from the incident scene for coordinated deployment.
- The use of quick-reference wallet guides for reporting and managing emergencies occurring on the system can be helpful.
- The use of equipment pre-staged throughout the system, including reinforced concrete barriers and portable fencing to support effective perimeter control on-scene, is advisable.
- Implementation of revised procedures to direct the ways in which public transportation personnel report to an incident scene, are tracked at the scene, and are appropriately credentialed and protected to enter potentially hazardous areas.

Table 7-8 lists reminders on terrorism response and preparedness.



Figure 7-5. Response protocol for suspected terrorist incident.



Figure 7-6. Schematic for response in transportation environment.

TABLE 7-7 Checklist for response to events indicating WMD agent release

CHECKLIST FOR RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL / NON-ROUTINE EVENTS THAT COULD INDICATE WMD AGENT RELEASE
Remain Aware of the Possibilities -- Look for Indicators.
Based on the report(s) received, is there ONE indicator of a potential CBRN incident?
o There are two or more people displaying the same unexplained symptoms.
o There is an unexplained substance, low-lying cloud, residue, smell, or oily coating.
o There is an unusual/out-of-place package or item
o There are discarded aerosol spray devices, medical masks and/or equipment.
o There are unexplained/out-of-place actions of persons wearing personal protective equipment or appearing shielded or covered.
o There are an unusual number of dead or dying insects or animals.
o There is an unusual abundance of insects or animals entering the system.
Based on reports received from the scene, is there MORE THAN ONE indicator of a potential incident?
o Multiple indicators from above list OR
o Any of the indicators from the above list PLUS
▪ Location of the report is a populated area or event was previously identified by vulnerability assessments as a possible target.
▪ There is a known threat against this location.
▪ There also has been an explosion or fire at this location.
▪ There are transportation and/or public safety responders injured, incapacitated or unaccounted for at the location.
▪ There are multiple victims at the incident location
▪ The unusual event is occurring on a symbolic date.
▪ The unusual event is occurring when reports from local law enforcement indicate heightened threat levels.
If There Is One Indicator, Approach the Scene with Heightened Awareness.
Be alert for additional indicators when nearing the scene.
Double-check the proper functioning of communications equipment, though the use of mobile phones or hand-held radios is not recommended if secondary devices may be present.
Be prepared to change the approach if additional indicators are identified.
If There Is More Than One Indicator, Scene May Be a Terrorist Incident. Consider Additional Response Measures, Prior to Reaching Incident Location.
Initiate notifications according to transportation system internal procedures and local emergency response plan.
Consider a law enforcement escort.
Initiate approach with EXTREME caution.
Be alert for actions against responders (including secondary devices, secondary

TABLE 7-7 (Continued)

releases, and assaults).
Evaluate available PPE measures.
Identify possible escape routes, and designate rally or regrouping points in the event that the incident site is hazardous.
Identify possible locations for water, sand, dirt, towels, or other materials that could remove contamination.
Coordinate Scene Approach.
Approach scene from upwind and upgrade. Ensure that others do the same. Minimum safe upwind distance for a possible chemical incident is at least 300 feet, and 1,000 feet for an explosives-related incident.
While approaching incident scene, identify and report safe staging location(s) for incoming responders and resources (as appropriate).
If scene indicates a substance, package or other event that can be investigated through standard agency procedures, initiate investigation, maintaining awareness regarding the need for local public safety agencies, even if it means closing the station and disrupting service.
If observation from a safe vantage point indicates an unfolding event, remain calm and observe scene; do not attempt rescue. Immediate and accurate field reports are the best way to help victims and ensure the greatest good for the greatest number.
From a safe vantage point, attempt to determine the exact location(s) of the toxic substance. Observe patterns or clusters in the severity of symptoms demonstrated by victims, and also observe where the ambulatory victims have assembled.
From a safe vantage point, by yelling or with bull horn, station or vehicle public address system, telephone or radio, attempt to establish communication with transportation/public safety personnel on scene. These personnel may be contaminated, incapacitated, or unable to support response action. If possible, ascertain their status and location.
Be aware of the need for protection from possible contamination. Consider the need for maximum respiratory protection. If PPE is available, and if transportation personnel are appropriately trained, don PPE. Otherwise, observe upwind distance parameters.
Establish Command.
Prior to providing dispatch with an assessment, establish command at scene, or join in with the on-going effort at scene. This is particularly important in cases where transportation operations and law enforcement personnel will jointly manage the scene.
Transportation personnel are the on-scene authority figures immediately following the incident and will be integrated into the ICS established by local responders upon their arrival.
Enlist other transportation/law enforcement personnel to control the scene by isolating it from further entry by passengers and personnel. As appropriate, depending on the events at the scene, enlist transportation/law enforcement personnel to direct evacuation of scene (from a safe distance) using voice,

(*continued on next page*)

TABLE 7-7 (Continued)

bullhorns or public address announcements.
Assign other transportation personnel/law enforcement personnel responding to the scene to provide/designate safe staging locations for incoming units and to assess the scene for hazards to responders.
Assign other transportation personnel/law enforcement personnel to assess emergency egress routes (as appropriate) and re-define rally points (if necessary).
Ensure personnel accountability, establishing sign-in and tracking procedures for employees at the scene.
Assess security of the approach; be cognizant regarding the possibility of secondary devices or attacks aimed at responders.
Conduct Incident Size-Up And Assessment.
When observing the scene, look for the following:
O Exact location of incident;
O Nearest upwind street access;
O Estimated number of casualties;
O Signs and symptoms of casualties;
O Presence of oily liquids, vapors, clouds and mists;
O Unusual odors, color of smoke, vapor clouds;
O Weather conditions (if appropriate);
O Status of station/facility ventilation systems (if appropriate);
O Other resources available to support immediate evacuation from the scene and initial decontamination (sprinkler system, nearby swimming pool or lake, dirt or sand, towels or cloth);
O Information available on possible perpetrators, including physical descriptions, clothing, make/model of vehicles, or other identifying characteristics;
O Whether witnesses to the event have been identified (or reported from the affected area by transportation/law enforcement personnel);
O Debris field near the device (if applicable);
O Exact location of transportation/law enforcement/public safety personnel at the scene and the status of these personnel;
O Presence of structural damage without an apparent cause; and
O System disruptions (e.g., power outages, fire alarms, sprinkler systems).
Report incident to transportation Dispatch/Control center, summarizing what is observed.
Consider the need for additional/specialized resources (fire, EMS, HAZMAT unit, law enforcement/EDU [bomb squad], emergency management, public works, public health, environmental agencies, others).
Consider scene as potential crime scene, and report information to dispatch keeping in mind that everything at the scene is potential evidence.
Understand that Dispatch/Control Center will make appropriate notifications (according to system procedures, and based on requests for specialized resources).

TABLE 7-7 (Continued)

Carefully observe and report signs and systems to transportation Dispatch/Control Center; from a safe vantage point monitor the medical condition of those who appear affected, providing assessments of any change in their condition. If possible, identify commonalities in signs and symptoms, using criteria listed below. Odors listed may be identified by victims. Smelling an agent is not suggested.

CHEMICAL AGENT	SYMPTOMS AND ODOR
Nerve Agents **Tabun** **Sarin** **Soman** **VX**	SLUDGE symptoms**:** **S**alivation **L**acrimation (excessive tearing) **U**rination **D**efecation **G**astric - **E**mptying Pinpoint pupils (everything looks dark) Seizures Odor: possible fruity smell
Cyanides **Hydrogen Cyanide** **Cyanogen Chloride**	Symptoms: anxiety, hyperventilation, difficulty breathing. Cherry-red skin is possible, though not often seen. Odor: Bitter almonds
Vesicants **Mustard** **Lewisite**	Symptoms: redness and blistering of the skin. Inhalation injury may result in respiratory distress. Odor: horseradish, onions, garlic or mustard
Pulmonary Intoxicants **Chlorine** **Phosgene**	Symptoms: Delayed onset of non-cardiogenic pulmonary edema; collapse. Odor: Phosgene: Newly mown hay. Chlorine: Swimming pool water. Anhydrous Ammonia: Acrid, sharp scent.
Riot Control Agents **Pepper Spray** **Mace**	Symptoms: Ear, nose, mouth and eye irritation. Odor: pepper or irritating scent.

(*continued on next page*)

TABLE 7-7 (Continued)

	Tear Gas		
Focus On Establishing Perimeter(s) and Organizing Scene for Responders.			
Get incident scene ready for arriving responders.			
Establish control over scene by the following actions.			
O Establishing/re-defining the **outer incident perimeter** to provide safe ingress and egress for arriving responders, and the **inner incident perimeter** to isolate the hazardous area.			
O Ensuring that incident scene has been evacuated by all ambulatory persons and that access to this area is now sealed off.			
O Clearly separating and controlling evacuated persons who appear unaffected at the scene from walking casualties who appear affected by:			
▪ Using voice, bullhorn, or public address system to direct those who appear/or may be contaminated upwind/upgrade from the incident site, but away from the evacuation site; and			
▪ Providing reassurance, discouraging self-evacuation, and communicating (using voice, bullhorn or public address system) that responders are on their way.			
O Continue to watch scene for unusual activity; perpetrators may be nearby or could be among the injured.			
O Maintain awareness, anticipating the potential for multiple hazard locations that may require re-defining outer (and inner) operational perimeters.			
At all times, be aware of site security and check for snipers, secondary devices, suspicious packages, or other threats.			
Continue to monitor weather and wind; remain upwind of scene release.			
Identify water supply or other decontamination materials in vicinity (sprinkler system, pool, pond, dirt, clean fabric, etc.).			
Coordinate staging and arrival of first responders:			
O If practical, position first arriving units and responders upwind and uphill;			
O Direct other units to approach from upwind and uphill if possible;			
O Avoid stacking units where they interfere with each other's evacuation route;			
O Avoid line-of-sight staging with suspected explosive devices;			
O Strictly enforce staging instructions;			
O Consider having units back into position so that they can leave the scene efficiently, and			
O Avoid vapor clouds, mist, and unknown liquids.			
Maintain communications with Dispatch/Control Center, notify of changes in weather conditions, available site resources, and condition of assembled victims.			
Await other transportation personnel and first responders.			
Prepare listing of safety threats/scene hazards for arriving responders. Consider the **TRACEM** mechanisms: **T**hermal, **R**adiological, **A**sphyxiant, **C**hemical, **E**tiological, and **M**echanical.			

TABLE 7-7 (Continued)

Update estimates of victims (ambulatory and non-ambulatory).
Remember that the incident scene is also a crime scene and all precautions need to be taken to preserve evidence.
Begin to identify witnesses and other people at scene.
Prepare to join in UC with local fire service responders and law enforcement.
Assign transportation incident safety and public relations functions to work with arriving responders.
Meet and brief arriving responders. Provide the most up-to-date information available.
Support Arriving Responders.
Work with responders to ensure that appropriate notifications are made to potentially affected organizations that may support response to incident (local hospitals, local public health agencies, local EMA, mutual aid partners, etc.)
Provide responders with maps, schematics, drawings and/or pictures of affected facility, as well as CCTV feeds (if available) and a full briefing regarding operation of emergency communications technology within the station, facility or location.
Support responder needs for special resources, perhaps available within the transportation system or locations served by the transportation system.
Ensure that transportation safety and liaison personnel provide first responders with full briefings regarding any special or developing hazards at the scene.
Ensure that responders and transportation personnel understand incident response layout and containment zones, and where transportation personnel are and are not allowed to go. It is advisable that a credentialing system be established, if possible.
Depending on weather and wind conditions, it is suggested that transportation personnel stand ready to provide vehicles, equipment, water/stand-pipe access, and blankets to support responder efforts to decontaminate and transport victims.
It is advisable that transportation personnel coordinate public information requirements with the UC established by local responders, and consider the impacts of the event on their own service.
It is suggested that transportation personnel work with responders to determine if security conditions are such that a full or partial system shutdown is appropriate.

TABLE 7-8 Reminders

PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT.

- Planning. Participate in joint planning and assessment with local community and responders.
- Documentation. Commit policies and procedures to writing.
- Exercises. Drill each step and the whole program.
- Knowledge. Keep up with new developments.
- Communication. Evaluate technology and procedures.
- Sharing. Exchange plans, procedures and concerns with local responders.

REMEMBER RAPID-T.

- R - Recognition.
- P - Protection.
- D - Decontamination.
- T - Triage, Treatment.

THINK LONG-TERM.

- Be safe, be prepared. Do not become a victim!
- A good first response sets the stage.
- Concentrate on good common sense planning.

STAY AWARE.

- Approach scene from upwind/upgrade.
- Wear at least respiratory protection immediately.
- Alert other responders of potentially dangerous conditions.
- Restrict entry to area.
- Evaluate victims' signs/symptoms and alert others.

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